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FRAME V. KOTHARI: MAY PLAINTIFFS RECOVER IN NEW
JERSEY FOR THE EMOTIONAL DISTRESS SUFFERED DUE
TO THE NEGLIGENT MISDIAGNOSIS OF THIRD
PERSONS?
I. INTRODUCTION
The recent New Jersey Supreme Court decision in Frame v. Kothari'
has potentially broad implications for the tort of negligent infliction of
emotional distress. In Frame the parents of a ten-month-old child
brought an action to recover for the emotional distress they suffered as a
result of the negligent misdiagnosis and subsequent death of their son.
2
The court applied the traditional tort rule governing bystander recovery
and denied recovery on the grounds that the physician's negligent mis-
diagnosis, the manifestation of injury in the boy, and the observation by
the parents were not sufficiently contemporaneous to meet the require-
ments of the rule. 3 Thus, although recovery was denied in the case, the
Frame court, agreeing with a recent California Supreme Court decision,
stated that such a cause of action is available and suggested that recov-
ery would be permitted under more "shocking" circumstances. 4 The
decision is significant because it represents a potential expansion of the
law regarding emotional distress recovery.5 This article will discuss the
proposed cause of action and the criteria a practitioner must demon-
strate in order to prove or disprove such a claim.6
1. 115 N.J. 638, 560 A.2d 675 (1989).
2. Id. at 640-41, 560 A.2d at 676-77. For a discussion of the facts of Frame,
see infra notes 7-27 and accompanying text.
3. Frame, 115 N.J. at 650, 560 A.2d at 681. For a discussion of the by-
stander recovery rule, see infra notes 28-39 and accompanying text.
4. Frame, 115 NJ. at 648-49, 560 A.2d at 680-81. For a discussion of the
court's analysis, see infra notes 52-102 and accompanying text.
5. See Frame, 115 N.J. at 651, 560 A.2d at 682 (Wilentz, C.J., and Garibaldi,
J., concurring) (discussing majority's expansion of emotional distress recovery).
The courts have generally been unwilling to expand the bystander recovery
rule, particularly in medical malpractice cases. See, e.g., Lindenmuth v. Alperin,
197 N.J. Super. 385, 484 A.2d 1316 (Law Div. 1984). For a discussion of
Lindenmuth, see infra notes 46-49 and accompanying text.
Emotional distress recovery continues to be a controversial issue in the
courts of New Jersey. In addition to the Frame case, the Supreme Court of New
Jersey has very recently decided a number of cases in which emotional distress
recovery was an issue. See, e.g., Mauro v. Raymark Indus., 116 N.J. 126, 561 A.2d
257 (1989) (plaintiff who suffered enhanced risk of cancer due to asbestos expo-
sure able to recover for emotional distress and for medical surveillance, but not
for enhanced risk of contracting disease without showing that contraction is
probable); Giardina v. Bennett, 111 N.J. 412, 545 A.2d 139 (1988) (parents al-
lowed to recover for emotional distress that resulted from doctor's negligence in
causing pre-birth death of infant).
6. The focus throughout this article is on New Jersey case law. However,
(477)
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II. FRAME V. KOTHARI: THE FACTS
On January 22, 1982, between 6:30 and 7:30 a.m., the Frame's ten-
month-old son Arik fell down the stairway in their home.7 The plaintiff
parents took the boy to the defendant Health Care Plan of New Jersey
(Health Care) where he was treated by one of Health Care's employees,
defendant Dr. Kothari, a board-certified pediatrician. 8 Dr. Kothari ex-
amined the boy and determined that he had a fever of 102 degrees and a
soft spot on the back of his head.9 Dr. Kothari diagnosed the boy as
suffering from a virus and told the Frames to wake the boy every four
hours and check for symptoms of head injury.' 0
The Frames returned home and put their son to bed." When they
woke him at 2:00 p.m. they became nervous and called Dr. Kothari. 12
According to Dr. Kothari, Mr. Frame stated that the boy had vomited. 13
According to the Frames, Mr. Frame told the doctor that the boy's eyes
were "pivoting."' 14 Dr. Kothari advised the parents to let the boy sleep
for another four hours. 15 When the parents tried to awaken the boy at
6:00 p.m., he was in a near-death state. 16
The Frames immediately took their son to Cooper Medical Center,
where x-rays revealed the presence of a blood clot at the rear of his
skull. 17 Emergency surgery was performed around midnight, and the
Frames returned home at around 3:00 a.m. 18 The hospital called about
two hours later to inform them that Arik had died. 19
The Frames brought an action to recover both for the wrongful
death of their son and for negligent infliction of emotional distress.2 0
The Frames alleged that Dr. Kothari was negligent in failing to give
them proper instructions during the 2:00 p.m. telephone conversa-
tion. 2 1 Moreover, Mrs. Frame claimed that the discovery of her son four
because the California courts have been so influential in this area, this article
also includes a number of references to California case law.
7. Frame, 115 N.J. at 640, 560 A.2d at 676.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id. There was conflicting testimony on this issue. The plaintiffs "dis-
puted Dr. Kothari's testimony that she told them 'to check for the pupils, I asked
them to watch for vomiting.' " Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 641, 560 A.2d at 676.
15. Id., 560 A.2d at 677.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id. A subsequent autopsy indicated that the boy died from an "intra-
cerebellar hemorrhage due to a blunt trauma to the skull." Id.
20. Id.
21. Id.
[Vol. 35: p. 477
2
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 35, Iss. 2 [1990], Art. 7
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol35/iss2/7
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
hours later in a moribund state caused her to become severely de-
pressed,2 2 while Mr. Frame claimed that his personality changed follow-
ing his son's death, that he became isolated from his family and friends,
and that he continued to suffer a deep sense of loss.
23
The Superior Court, Law Division, Camden County, awarded the
plaintiffs $10,000 for the wrongful death of their son and $500 each for
emotional distress. 24 The Superior Court, Appellate Division, affirmed
as to the wrongful death award but reversed as to the emotional distress
award.2 5 The Supreme Court of NewJersey affirmed the decision of the
Appellate Division.2 6 Significantly, however, the court also recognized
in dicta that a cause of action for emotional distress may exist for plain-
tiffs who witness the negligent misdiagnosis of a family member. 2 7
22. Id. A psychiatrist diagnosed Mrs. Frame as suffering from "a chronic
post-traumatic stress disorder," and he attributed this disorder to the series of
events which started with the boy's fall and ended with his death. Id.
23. Id. Seven months after the death of their son the Frames separated, and
they were divorced by the time of trial. Id. In addition, Mrs. Frame had a child
with another man in the belief that she would "feel better" if she had another
baby. Id.
24. Id. at 640, 560 A.2d at 676.
25. Frame v. Kothari, 218 N.J. Super. 537, 547, 528 A.2d 86, 92 (App. Div.
1987). In reversing the emotional distress award, the Superior Court, Appellate
Division, reasoned that "mere advice and failure to properly diagnose and treat
does not satisfy the [bystander recovery rule] requirement of an 'incident.' " Id.
at 545-46, 528 A.2d at 91. Although the superior court stated that the "viewing
of the infant in his death-like state" may have been an incident, it was not the
type of incident contemplated in the adoption of the bystander recovery rule.
Id. at 546, 528 A.2d at 91.
The superior court also based its holding on policy determinations. The
court stated that "to impose liability where the malpractice merely consists of an
improper diagnosis will result in too great a cost to society and have a pro-
foundly deleterious impact on the medical profession to the detriment of our
society as a whole." Id.
26. Frame, 115 N.J. at 650, 560 A.2d at 682.
27. Id. at 649, 560 A.2d at 681. The majority opinion, written by Justice
Pollock and joined by four other members of the court, stated that, "[in an
appropriate case, if a family member witnesses the physician's malpractice, ob-
serves the effect of the malpractice on the patient, and immediately connects the
malpractice with the injury, that may be sufficient to allow recovery for the fam-
ily member's emotional distress. Such an event could be shocking." Id.
Two members of the Frame court, however, believed that the majority's
opinion was premature. See id. at 651, 560 A.2d at 682 (Wilentz, C.J., and Gari-
baldi, J., concurring). Specifically, the concurring opinion stated:
We would, however, await "an appropriate case" before deciding
whether the common-law remedy for death or serious injury caused by
medical malpractice should be extended to the consequent emotional
distress of family members, including situations in which family mem-
bers are contemporaneously aware that the misiagnosis [sic] is causing
injury to their loved one.
Id. (Wilentz, C.J., and Garibaldi, J., concurring).
1990] 479
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III. BACKGROUND
A. Bystander Emotional Distress Recovery
Traditionally, courts have been reluctant to allow plaintiffs to re-
cover for emotional distress.28 This reluctance has been especially ap-
parent in "bystander" cases, in which plaintiffs seek to recover for the
mental disturbance caused not by fear for their own safety, but rather by
"witnessing some peril or harm to another person."' 29 The courts have
28. Diamond, Dillon v. Legg Revisited: Toward a Unified Theory of Compensating
Bystanders and Relatives for Intangible Injuries, 35 HASTINGS L.J. 477, 480 (1984); see
also W.P. KEETON, D. ROBBS, R. KEETON & D. OWENS, PROSSER AND KEETON ON
THE LAW OF TORTS § 54, at 359-60 (5th ed. 1984 & Supp. 1988) [hereinafter
PROSSER & KEETON ON TORTS]; Case Comment, Dillon Revisited. Toward a Better
Paradigm for Bystander Cases, 43 OHIo ST. L.J. 931, 932-33 (1982); see generally
Comment, Negligent Infliction of Mental Distress: A Jurisdictional Survey of Existing
Limitation Devices and Proposal Based on an Analysis of Objective Versus Subjective Indices
of Distress, 33 VILL. L. REV. 781, 782-817 (1988) (detailed discussion of various
approaches taken in mental distress cases).
The initial common law rule allowed recovery for mental distress only as a
"parasitic" damage accompanying physical "impact." PROSSER & KEETON ON
TORTS, supra, § 54, at 363 (discussing theory that requisite "impact" was sup-
posed to afford desired guarantee that mental distress is genuine); Diamond,
supra, at 480; see Ward v. West Jersey & Seashore R.R., 65 NJ.L. 383, 47 A. 561
(NJ. 1900) (applying impact rule).
The impact rule, however, did not succeed in limiting frivolous emotional
distress claims because "plaintiffs devised tortured interpretations of the re-
quirement, allowing the slightest physical impact to be a springboard to get a
bystander recovery case into court." Note, Limiting Liability for the Negligent Inflic-
tion of Emotional Distress: The "Bystander Recovery" Cases, 54 S. CAL. L. REV. 847,
849 (1981) [hereinafter Note, Limiting Liability]; see, e.g., Zelinsky v. Chimics, 196
Pa. Super. 312, 318-19, 175 A.2d 351, 354 (1961) (plaintiffs able to proceed with
emotional distress claim upon showing that they were "jostled and jarred" in
automobile collision).
Eventually, the courts were confronted with cases in which there was no
actual impact, but in which impact was dangerously close. These "near miss"
cases led the majority of courts to reject the physical impact rule in favor of the
"zone of danger" approach. Diamond, supra, at 480; see also Note, The Next Best
Thing to Being There?: Foreseeability of Media-Assisted Bystanders, 17 Sw. U.L. REV. 65,
67-68 (1987) (discussing weakness of impact rule and stating that "the impact
rule has been abandoned in the vast majority of American jurisdictions in favor
of either the zone of danger test or a [foreseeable bystander] approach"); see,
e.g., Falzone v. Busch, 45 N.J. 559, 569, 214 A.2d 12, 17 (1965) (court rejected
impact rule where defendant drove automobile dangerously close to plaintiff).
Under the zone of danger rule, a plaintiff may recover for emotional dis-
tress, regardless of whether there was actual physical impact, if she could show:
(1) that she was in the zone of physical danger, and (2) that the mental distress
suffered was physically manifested. Diamond, supra, at 480-8 1; see also Note, Lim-
iting Liability, supra, at 849-53; Case Comment, supra, at 934-36.
The zone of danger rule, like the predecessor impact rule, has been criti-
cized as being ineffective in dealing with the fear of unlimited liability in emo-
tional distress cases. Note, Limiting Liability, supra, at 850-53.
29. PROSSER & KEETON ON TORTS, supra note 28, § 54, at 365; see Note, Lim-
iting Liability, supra note 28, at 847-48.
The typical fact situation in a bystander case involves a parent who wit-
nesses her child being injured or killed in an automobile accident. Note, Limiting
480
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adopted rules that allow bystanders to recover for emotional distress;
however, due to the fears of unlimited liability for negligent acts and of
overburdening the courts with emotional distress litigation, the courts
have drawn such rules rather conservatively. 30
In Portee v. Jaffee3 ' the New Jersey Supreme Court set forth the cur-
rent approach taken by the New Jersey courts in bystander cases. The
Portee court adopted a bystander recovery rule similar to that followed in
other jurisdictions.3 2 The court held that the plaintiff mother could
maintain a cause of action for the emotional distress she suffered as a
result of her witnessing the aftermath of an elevator accident that ulti-
Liability, supra note 28, at 847-48, 855-56. Thus, the typical case involves some
"sudden occurrence." See Ochoa v. Superior Court, 39 Cal. 3d 159, 167, 703
P.2d 1, 6, 216 Cal. Rptr. 661, 666 (1985) ("Many of the subsequent cases requir-
ing an application of the Dillon factors have also involved situations similar to the
Dillon case where there was a brief, sudden occurrence."). For a discussion of
Ochoa, see infra notes 78-83 and accompanying text. For a discussion of Dillon,
see infra note 32.
30. See PROSSER & KEETON ON TORTS, supra note 28, § 54, at 360-61. A
number of reasons have been articulated for the courts' reluctance to allow by-
standers to recover for emotional distress: (1) mental distress cannot be mea-
sured in terms of money; (2) the physical consequences of a mental disturbance
are too remote, and therefore not proximately caused; (3) there is a lack of pre-
cedent; and (4) there would be a vast increase in litigation. Id. at 360; see also
Diamond, supra note 28, at 480 n.20. These objections have been referred to
collectively as the "general fear of unlimited liability." Note, Limiting Liability,
supra note 28, at 847 n.7.
31. 84 N.J. 88, 417 A.2d 521 (1980).
32. Id. at 97-101, 417 A.2d at 526-28. The Portee court adopted a rule simi-
lar to that announced by the Supreme Court of California in Dillon v. Legg, 68
Cal. 2d 728, 441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968).
The Dillon court departed from the majority rule that plaintiffs must have
been in the zone of danger before they may recover for mental distress. The
court allowed the plaintiff mother to recover for the mental distress caused by
her witnessing an accident that killed her daughter, even though the plaintiff
herself was in a position of complete safety. Dillon, 68 Cal. 2d at 733, 441 P.2d at
915, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 75.
The Dillon court determined that under certain circumstances a bystander
may be a foreseeable plaintiff, and hence is owed a duty of reasonable care. See
id. at 740, 441 P.2d at 920, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 80; see also Diamond, supra note 28, at
481-83 (discussing Dillon rule); Case Comment, supra note 28, at 943-48 (de-
tailed discussion of Dillon observation and location guidelines).
The Dillon court set forth several guidelines relevant in determining
whether the plaintiff owes such a duty:
(1) whether plaintiff was located near the scene of the accident as con-
trasted with one who was a distance away from it; (2) whether the shock
resulted from a direct emotional impact upon plaintiff from the sensory
and contemporaneous observance of the accident, as contrasted with
learning of the accident from others after its occurrence; (3) whether
plaintiff and the victim were closely related, as contrasted with an ab-
sence of any relationship or the presence of only a distant relationship.
Dillon, 68 Cal. 2d at 740-41, 441 P.2d at 920, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 80.
Dillon has caused considerable controversy and has been applied inconsis-
tently by the courts. For a discussion of the criticisms and proposals made by
various commentators, see infra note 94.
5
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mately killed her son.3 3 The court held that a plaintiff could recover for
emotional distress if he or she could prove that: (1) the death or serious
physical injury of another was caused by the defendant's negligence;3 4
(2) a marital or intimate family relationship existed between the plaintiff
and the injured person; 35 (3) the plaintiff observed the death or injury at
the scene of the accident;3 6 and (4) severe emotional distress resulted.3 7
The Portee rule is arguably well suited to handle the typical by-
stander case in which a parent witnesses a child being injured in a sud-
den accident.3 8 The rule, however, is not so easily applied to other
situations, and courts generally have been unwilling to expand the Portee
doctrine, allowing recovery only where the requirements of the rule are
33. Portee, 84 N.J. at 90, 417 A.2d at 522. The facts of the Portee case were
extremely tragic. A seven-year-old boy was trapped in an elevator shaft between
the door and the wall of the elevator shaft. Id. at 91,417 A.2d at 522. When the
elevator was activated the boy was dragged up by the elevator. Id. Police of-
ficers and the boy's mother soon arrived at the scene. Id. For four and one-half
hours the officers tried to free the child. Id. The boy's mother watched as her
son "moaned, cried out and flailed his arms." Id. "[The boy] died while still
trapped, his mother a helpless observer." Id., 417 A.2d at 523.
After her son's death, the mother suffered severe depression and became
self-destructive, attempting to take her own life. Id. at 91-92, 417 A.2d at 523.
Subsequently, she brought an action against the owners of the building and two
elevator companies asserting survival and wrongful death claims and seeking
damages in her own right for the mental distress she suffered by witnessing her
son's anguish and death. Id. at 92, 417 A.2d at 523.
34. Id. at 101,417 A.2d at 528. The recovery allowed under Portee is limited
by the degree of severity of the injury that led to the mental distress. Id. The
Portee court pointed out that, when confronted with accidental death, the ex-
pected reaction of normal persons is shock and fright. Id. at 100, 417 A.2d at
528 (quoting Caputzal v. Lindsay Co., 48 N.J. 69, 76, 222 A.2d 513, 517 (1966)).
The court held, therefore, that death or serious injury is necessary to permit
recovery. Id.
35. Id. at 101, 417 A.2d at 528. In discussing the familial relationship re-
quirement, the Portee court stated that "[ijt is the presence of deep, intimate,
familial ties between the plaintiff and the physically injured person that makes
the harm to emotional tranquility so serious and compelling." Id. at 98, 417
A.2d at 526-27.
36. Id. at 101, 417 A.2d at 528. In discussing the contemporaneous obser-
vation requirement, the Portee court stated:
Discovering the death or serious injury of an intimate family member
will always be expected to threaten one's emotional welfare. Ordina-
rily, however, only a witness at the scene of the accident causing death
or serious injury will suffer a traumatic sense of loss that may destroy
his sense of security and cause severe emotional distress.
Id. at 99, 417 A.2d at 527.
37. Id. at 101, 417 A.2d at 528. Specifically, the Portee court stated that
"[t]he harm we have determined to be worthy of judicial redress is the trauma
accompanying the observation of the death or serious physical injury of a loved
one." Id. at 100, 417 A.2d at 527-28 (emphasis added).
38. See, e.g., Goncalvez ex rel. Goncalvez v. Patuto, 188 N.J. Super. 620, 458
A.2d 146 (App. Div. 1983) (Portee applied where father and brother witnessed
automobile-bicycle. accident in which child was killed).
[Vol. 35: p. 477482
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clearly met.3 9
B. Applying the Bystander Recovery Rule in Medical Malpractice Cases: The
Difficulty in Misdiagnosis Situations
In medical malpractice cases, a plaintiff may seek to recover for the
emotional distress suffered as a result of witnessing a physician's negli-
gent medical treatment of a third person. Such a plaintiff seeks to re-
cover as a bystander and thus the Portee rule applies. 40 In Polikoff v.
Calabro4 ' the plaintiff mother was allowed to recover for the emotional
distress resulting from her observation of the defendant physician's neg-
ligent administration of fluids into her daughter's jugular vein, causing
her daughter to die two hours later of cardiac failure. 42 Thus, the courts
of New Jersey allow bystander emotional distress recovery in medical
malpractice cases where there has been an observable negligently per-
formed medical procedure. 4
3
On the other hand, claims for emotional distress in the medical mis-
39. See, e.g., Eyrich ex rel. Eyrich v. Dam, 193 N.J. Super. 244, 473 A.2d 539
(App. Div.) (refusing to allow neighbor-guardian of child to meet familial rela-
tionship requirement of Portee), cert. denied, 97 N.J. 583, 483 A.2d 127 (1984).
It should be noted, however, that although Portee allows plaintiffs who were
not in the zone of physical danger to recover under certain circumstances, plain-
tiffs who were in the zone of danger may still recover without regard to the Portee
requirements. See, e.g., id. at 255-59, 473 A.2d at 545-47 (neighbor-guardian did
not meet Portee requirements, but, in rescuing child from circus animal, became
rescuer whose intervention was foreseeable and who could recover under tradi-
tional rule).
40. For a discussion of the typical "bystander," see supra note 29 and ac-
companying text. For a discussion of the Portee rule, see supra notes 31-39 and
accompanying text.
41. 209 N.J. Super. 110, 506 A.2d 1285 (App. Div. 1986).
42. Id. at 112, 506 A.2d at 1286-87. The physician had inserted a catheter
into the child's right internal jugular vein for the introduction of hyperalimenta-
tion fluid. Id. The catheter, however, was not positioned properly and the girl
died two hours later of a cardiac tamponade. Id. The plaintiff was present dur-
ing the two hours between the start of the hyperalimentation and the child's
death. Id.
43. Cases like Polikoffsupport the general proposition that recovery is per-
mitted where the plaintiff has witnessed some injury-producing event. For a dis-
cussion of the injury-producing event requirement, see infra notes 55-59 and
accompanying text.
It should be noted that the courts of New Jersey have also allowed family
members to recover for emotional distress in the medical malpractice context
along a separate line of cases. Where the physician's negligence involves the
diagnosis or treatment of an unborn child, the courts of NewJersey have allowed
the parents to recover for emotional distress as direct victims of the physician's
negligence. See, e.g., Giardina v. Bennett, 111 N.J. 412, 415, 545 A.2d 139, 140
(1988) (In allowing parents to recover for emotional distress court stated that
"[m]edical malpractice causing a stillbirth results in infliction of a direct injury to
the mother as well as to her unborn child.").
This direct-victim type of analysis is similar to that applied by the courts of
California. See Molien v. Kaiser Found. Hosps., 27 Cal. 3d 916, 616 P.2d 813,
167 Cal. Rptr. 831 (1980) (husband allowed to recover from wife's physician for
7
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diagnosis context have been less successful. As a general proposition, it
seems clear that in any type of case the discovery of "the death or seri-
ous injury of an intimate family member will always be expected to
threaten one's emotional welfare." '44 In medical misdiagnosis cases,
however, the difficulty in allowing third parties to recover for emotional
distress is that "[tihe nature of a misdiagnosis is such that its results may
neither manifest themselves immediately nor be shocking. Hours, days
or months may separate a misdiagnosis, the manifestations of the injury
to the patient, and the family member's observation of the injury."'4 5
In Lindenmuth v. Alperin4 6 a mother sought to recover for the emo-
tional distress resulting from the defendant physician's failure to diag-
nose an intestinal obstruction in the plaintiff's newborn child which
caused the child to die three days after birth.4 7 The court denied recov-
ery, holding that a misdiagnosis does not qualify as an event that can be
observed by the plaintiff, as required by Portee.48 In addition, the
Lindenmuth case has been interpreted as denying recovery because the
injury occured gradually rather than as a result of a brief and sudden
event.
4 9
Thus, courts have distinguished cases where the basis of the cause
of action is a negligent misdiagnosis from cases where there has been an
observable medical procedure, 50 denying recovery in the former be-
mental distress that resulted from physician's misdiagnosis of wife as suffering
from syphilis).
44. Portee, 84 NJ. at 99, 417 A.2d at 527.
45. Frame v. Kothari, 115 N.J. 638, 644-45, 560 A.2d 675, 678 (1989).
46. 197 N.J. Super. 385, 484 A.2d 1316 (Law Div. 1984).
47. Id. at 386, 484 A.2d at 1316.
48. Id. In denying recovery, the Lindenmuth court stated that the "failure to
diagnose and treat an intestinal blockage was not '[an] event causing injury...
which can be the subject of sensory perception.' " Id. at 389, 484 A.2d at 1318
(quotingJansen v. Children's Hosp. Medical Center, 31 Cal. App. 3d 22, 24, 106
Cal. Rptr. 883, 885 (1973)). The Lindenmuth court went on to state that the
"[p]laintiff's emotional distress arose from observing the result rather than an
act." Id.
The Frame court discussed a number of similar cases from other jurisdic-
tions. For a discussion of these cases, see infra note 59 and accompanying text.
49. See Frame, 115 N.J. at 645, 560 A.2d at 679 (Lindenmuth can be inter-
preted as "denying recovery when the mother watched the deterioration of her
child over a period of three days without appreciation of the impact of the doc-
tor's act of malpractice."). The Frame court discussed cases from other jurisdic-
tions that support the proposition that a slow deterioration in health will not
support recovery for emotional distress. For a discussion of these cases, see
infra note 77 and accompanying text.
50. In allowing recovery in a medical treatment case, the Polikoff court ad-
dressed the distinction between the misdiagnosis type of case and the observable
medical procedure type of case. See Polikoff v. Calabro, 209 N.J. Super. 110,
114-15, 506 A.2d 1285, 1288 (App. Div. 1986). The Polikoffcourt distinguished
the cause of action before it from the cause of action in Lindenmuth, stating that
"[a]ccording to plaintiffs' theory of the malpractice action, their child did not die
as a result of the disease or condition for which she was being treated but rather
[Vol. 35: p. 477484
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cause plaintiffs have been unable to show a contemporaneous observation as
required by Portee.5 1
IV. FRAME V. KOTHARI: NEW JERSEY ADDRESSES THE MEDICAL
MISDIAGNOSIS ISSUE
In Frame v. Kothari52 the Supreme Court of New Jersey specifically
addressed the issues raised when the bystander recovery rule is applied
in the medical misdiagnosis context. 53 That is, the court confronted the
difficult problem plaintiffs face in these cases in attempting to show a
contemporaneous observation as required by Portee.
A. Frame Liberalizes the Contemporaneous Observation Requirement in
Medical Malpractice Cases
The contemporaneous observation requirement has been described
as consisting of three distinct elements: "(1) What was observed?
(2) How was it observed? [and] (3) When was it observed?" 5 4 The Frame
decision is analyzed in terms of these three questions.
her death was directly caused by an improperly conducted, physically intrusive
medical procedure." Id.
51. See Portee, 84 NJ. at 101,417 A.2d at 528 (requiring "observation of the
death or injury at the scene of the accident"). In the medical misdiagnosis situa-
tion, the injury suffered by the patient might not manifest itself contemporane-
ously with the physician's negligence. See Frame, 115 N.J. at 645, 560 A.2d at 679
("The observing family member will not be exposed to the harm of seeing a
healthy victim one moment and a severely injured one the next.") (citing Case
Comment, supra note 28, at 946). The injury may in fact manifest itself via a
gradual deterioration, possibly leading to death. Thus, it may be impossible for
the family member to observe the injury at the scene of the negligent act.
52. 115 N.J. 638, 560 A.2d 675 (1989).
53. See id. at 644, 560 A.2d at 678 ("Our focus here is on the right of one
family member to recover for the emotional distress caused by the medical mis-
diagnosis of another member of the family.").
54. Case Comment, supra note 28, at 943 (discussing "observation" guide-
line in Dillon rule).
The Portee formulation was drawn directly from the Dillon guidelines. See
Portee, 84 N.J. at 97-101, 417 A.2d at 526-28. Portee requires that in order to
recover for negligent infliction of emotional distress a plaintiff must show that
there was an observation of death or serious injury at the scene of the accident.
Id. at 101, 417 A.2d at 528. This requirement was derived from guideline
number two of the Dillon approach which directs the court to determine
"[w]hether the shock resulted from a direct emotional impact upon plaintiff
from the sensory and contemporaneous observance of the accident." Dillon v.
Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728, 740-41, 441 P.2d 912, 920, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72, 80 (1968).
Therefore, the same three-step analysis which was applied to Dillon may be ap-
plied to Portee as well.
For a discussion of the Portee rule, see supra notes 31-39 and accompanying
text. For a discussion of Dillon, see supra note 32.
4851990]
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1. What was observed?
a. The plaintiff must observe the physician's malpractice
Generally, the bystander rule requires that the plaintiff observe
some injury-producing event in order to recover for emotional dis-
tress.5 5 The Frame court held that in the medical misdiagnosis context
the plaintiff must observe the defendant's negligent act in order to re-
cover as a bystander. 56 Although it can be argued that the Lindenmuth
court set forth an equally strict requirement, a more accurate interpreta-
tion of the case is that it supports the general proposition that the obser-
vation of some injury-producing event will support recovery. 57 A few
courts have been much more liberal in applying the bystander rule, al-
lowing recovery where the plaintiff observed only the results of the de-
fendant's act. 58 Such cases, however, are the exception. Most courts
have allowed recovery only where the plaintiff observed some injury-
producing event. 59
55. See Portee v. Jaffee, 84 N.J. 88, 417 A.2d 521 (1980). In Portee, the
plaintiff alleged that the defendants were negligent in that they "fail[ed] to pro-
vide a safe elevator." Id. at 92, 417 A.2d at 523. This was not an act which could
have been "observed." In addition, the plaintiff did not witness the initial acci-
dent because she arrived at the scene after her son had become trapped in the
elevator. Id. at 91, 417 A.2d at 522. The plaintiff did, however, observe an in-
jury-producing event. That is, she observed her son while he was still trapped in
the elevator shaft and in great pain. Id., 417 A.2d at 522-23. Thus, the plaintiff
observed an injury-producing event which caused her mental trauma, and there-
fore she was allowed to maintain a cause of action for emotional distress.
56. Frame, 115 N.J. at 649, 560 A.2d at 681 ("[I]f a family member witnesses
the physician's malpractice, observes the effect of the malpractice on the patient,
and immediately connects the malpractice with the injury, that may be sufficient
to allow recovery for the family member's emotional distress.") (emphasis
added).
57. See Lindenmuth v. Alperin, 197 N.J. Super. 385, 389, 484 A.2d 1316,
1318 (Law Div. 1984) (failure to diagnose and treat was not event which could
be subject of sensory perception). For a discussion of Lindenmuth, see supra
notes 46-49 and accompanying text.
58. Archibald v. Braverman, 275 Cal. App. 2d 253, 256, 79 Cal. Rptr. 723,
725 (1969) (Plaintiff mother allowed to recover when she saw her severely in-jured child after accident took place. Court stated that "[m]anifestly, the shock
of seeing a child severely injured immediately after the tortious event may bejust as profound as that experienced in witnessing the accident itself."); Mercado
v. Transport of N.J., 176 N.J. Super. 234, 422 A.2d 800 (Law Div. 1980) (mother
allowed to recover after finding her son lying fatally injured in street after he had
been struck by bus); see Mobaldi v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 55 Cal. App. 3d 573,
583, 127 Cal. Rptr. 720, 727 (1976) ("Foreseeability depends upon what the
emotionally traumatized plaintiff observes. It is observation of the conse-
quences of the negligent act and not observation of the act itself that is likely to
cause trauma so severe as to result in physical injury.").
59. See, e.g.,Jansen v. Children's Hosp. Medical Center, 31 Cal. App. 3d 22,
24, 106 Cal. Rptr. 883, 884 (1973) (event causing injury must be subject of sen-
sory perception); see also Thing v. La Chusa, 48 Cal. 3d 644, 666, 771 P.2d 814,
828, 257 Cal. Rptr. 865, 879 (1989) ("Greater certainty and a more reasonable
limit on the exposure to liability for negligent conduct is possible by limiting the
right to recover ... to plaintiffs who personally and contemporaneously perceive
486 [Vol. 35: p. 477
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Whether the witness must observe the tortious act, the injury, or
both has been a key issue in bystander recovery cases. 60 Commentators
have argued that observing the family member's injury should be suffi-
cient to support emotional distress recovery. 6 1 In addition, it has been
suggested that the only justification for a rule which requires that the
plaintiff witness the act as well as the result is to limit the number of
potential plaintiffs, and that "[t]his rule excludes a wide spectrum of
claims in which the act is not observed in any manner, or worse, is non-
observable."' 62 Medical malpractice cases, for example, often present
the injury-producing event and its traumatic consequences."). For a discussion
of La Chusa, see infra note 95.
InJansen, a doctor failed to diagnose an ulcer in the plaintiff's five-year-old
child. 31 Cal. App. 3d at 23, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 884. The plaintiff mother sought
recovery for the emotional trauma she suffered by witnessing the pain-ridden
deterioration and death of her child. Id. The court denied recovery, stating that
the Dillon rule "contemplates a sudden and brief event causing the child's in-
jury .... [T]he event causing injury to the child must itself be one which can be
the subject of sensory perception." Id. at 24, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 884-85. This
"suddenness" requirement, however, was later rejected by the Supreme Court
of California. See Ochoa v. Superior Court, 39 Cal. 3d 159, 168, 703 P.2d 1, 7,
216 Cal. Rptr. 661, 667 (1985) ("[T]he 'sudden occurrence' requirement is an
unwarranted restriction on the Dillon guidelines.").
In Budavari v. Barry, 176 Cal. App. 3d 849, 222 Cal. Rptr. 446 (1986), the
plaintiff's husband was treated by the defendant physicians for chest and knee
injuries. Id. at 851, 222 Cal. Rptr. at 447. The physicians took chest X-rays
which showed a possible lesion on the husband's lung. Id. The physicians, how-
ever, failed to either inform the plaintiff's husband of the lesion or to further
investigate the problem. Id. As a result of the defendant's negligence the cancer
was not diagnosed until two years later, when it had become terminal. Id. The
plaintiff sought recovery for the emotional trauma she suffered while her hus-
band was dying. Id. The Budavari court denied recovery under Dillon, stating
that the "failure to detect cancer or to follow up on the X-ray findings was not an
,event' which could be witnessed." Id. at 853, 222 Cal. Rptr. at 448.
In Pate v. Children's Hosp., 158 Mich. App. 120, 404 N.W.2d 632 (1986),
the plaintiff alleged that the defendant hospital failed to diagnose that her sister
was suffering from pneumococcal pneumonitis (pneumonia). Id. at 121, 404
N.W.2d at 632. Two days later the plaintiff brought her sister to the defendant's
emergency room but she died while awaiting treatment. Id. at 122, 404 N.W.2d
at 632-33. The plaintiff sought to recover for the emotional distress suffered as
a result of the defendant's negligence. Id. at 121, 404 N.W.2d at 632. The
Michigan Court of Appeals denied recovery, stating that "[w]hat is missing from
these allegations is the contemporaneous infliction of a tortious injury that could
be described as an inherently shocking event. All that the plaintiff has alleged
are negligent omissions in the form of nonobservable events that occured two
days prior to the decedent's death." Id. at 124, 404 N.W.2d at 633.
60. Case Comment, supra note 28, at 944.
61. Id. at 945 ("The event that affects the plaintiff's emotional distress is
not the act, but the results of that act."); see Diamond, supra note 28, at 489
("[T]here is no persuasive evidence that contemporaneous sensory perception
of the actual accident is a prerequisite of severe mental harm, or that such per-
ception merits compensaton while witnessing the destructive results does not").
62. Case Comment, supra note 28, at 945 (suggesting better way to limit
number of potential plaintiffs would be to create more rigorous definition of
what "results"-that is, what kind of injury-would support recovery).
1990] 487
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situations in which the tortious conduct consists of nonobservable
events.6 3 In the medical malpractice context, however, the Frame court
set forth a strict requirement. Under Frame the plaintiff must "observe"
the physician's malpractice. 64
b. The plaintiff must observe severe results
The Frame court made it very clear that the results would have to be
severe to support recovery, stating that "[t]o justify recovery, the plain-
tiff should observe the kind of result that is associated with the aftermath
of an accident, such as bleeding, traumatic injury, and cries of pain."'6 5
The court went on to state that "[r]ecovery for the negligent infliction of
emotional distress is meant to cover the observation of shocking events
that do not occur in the daily lives of most people."166
Although this shocking event limitation is present in the bystander
analysis generally, it is most evident in the third-party medical malprac-
tice cases. 6 7 Given the facts before it, the Frame court seemed to rely on
63. Id. at 945 n.123.
64. Frame, 115 N.J. at 649, 560 A.2d at 681.
Although the plaintiff must observe the physician's act (i.e., the misdiagno-
sis), it is not clear whether the plaintiff must understand the tortious nature of
the defendant's act. The rule set forth by the Frame court requires the plaintiff to
show that she was able to connect the defendant's act to the family member's
injury. Id. This seems to suggest that the answer to the above question is yes-
the plaintiff must understand the tortious nature of the defendant's conduct. In
a recent California case, however, the California Supreme Court suggested that
the answer to this question should be no, stating that "such a requirement would
lead to the anomalous result that a mother who viewed her child being struck by
a car could not recover because she did not realize that the driver was intoxi-
cated." Ochoa v. Superior Court, 39 Cal. 3d 159, 170, 703 P.2d 1, 8, 216 Cal.
Rptr. 661, 668 (1985). For a discussion of the Ochoa case, see infra notes 78-83
and accompanying text.
65. Frame, 115 N.J. at 643, 560 A.2d at 678 (citing Gates v. Richardson, 719
P.2d 193, 199 (Wyo. 1986)). Frame's requirement is in line with the general ap-
proach taken in bystander cases. See Portee v. Jaffee, 84 NJ. 88, 101, 417 A.2d
521, 528 (1980) (plaintiff must show that "the death or serious physical injury of
another [was] caused by defendant's negligence"); Case Comment, supra note
28, at 946 (stating that, in general, only serious bodily harm or death will sup-
port recovery).
66. Frame, 115 N.J. at 643-44, 560 A.2d at 678 (citing Note, Limiting Liability,
supra note 28, at 871) (emphasis added).
67. See, e.g., Pate v. Children's Hosp., 158 Mich. App. 120, 124,404 N.W.2d
632, 633 (1986) (The court, in denying recovery for emotional distress based on
misdiagnosis of sister, stated that "[w]hat is missing from these allegations is the
contemporaneous infliction of a tortious injury that could be described as an
inherently shocking event."). For a further discussion of Pate, see supra note 59.
In discussing the cases in which plaintiffs have sought to recover for the
emotional distress suffered as a result of the defendant's malpractice upon a
third person, the Frame court stated that the "common thread running through
these cases is that a misdiagnosis normally does not create the kind of horrifying
scene that is a prerequisite for recovery." Frame, 115 N.J. at 647-48, 560 A.2d at
680.
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this limitation in denying recovery to the plaintiff parents.
68
2. How did the observation take place?
In the medical misdiagnosis situation, Frame requires that the plain-
tiff observe both the defendant's malpractice and the resulting injury.6 9
Thus, the "how" element is relevant for two distinct requirements. The
Frame court requires plaintiffs to show some sensory perception both of
68. See Frame, 115 N.J. at 650, 560 A.2d at 681. In denying recovery to the
plaintiff parents, the Frame court stated that "[t]he chain of circumstances,
although deeply tragic, were [sic] not 'shocking.'" Id.
A problem in analyzing and understanding bystander recovery cases is that
recovery may be allowed in one situation but denied in another similar instance
when both cases seem to meet the same requirements of the bystander recovery
rule. It appears that the "shocking event" limitation often forms the basis of
differentiation in resolving the "close" cases. For example, in Mercado v. Trans-
port of N.J., 176 N.J. Super. 234, 422 A.2d 800 (Law Div. 1980), a mother was
allowed to recover for emotional distress after she found her son lying fatally
injured in the street after he had been struck by a bus. On the other hand, in
Arauz v. Gerhardt, 68 Cal. App. 3d 937, 137 Cal. Rptr. 619 (1977), recovery was
denied to a plaintiff mother who found her child injured and bleeding after he
had been hit by a car. Applying the "shocking event" limitation, the differentia-
tion is that it is more shocking to see a fatally injured child than to see a child
with a bleeding cut.
One commentator has discussed the difficulty in distinguishing bystander
cases, comparing Archibald v. Braverman, 275 Cal. App. 2d 253, 79 Cal. Rptr.
723 (1969) with Arauz. See Note, Limiting Liability, supra note 28, at 859-61. In
Archibald, the plaintiff's 13-year-old son was severely injured when he purchased
negligently packaged gunpowder at defendant's store. 275 Cal. App. 2d at 254,
79 Cal. Rptr. at 724. The plaintiff was not present but arrived within moments
and suffered severe shock from seeing her injured son. Id. at 255, 79 Cal. Rptr.
at 724. The Archibald court allowed the plaintiff mother to recover for her emo-
tional distress stating that "the shock sustained by the mother herein was 'con-
temporaneous' with the explosion so as to satisfy the 'observance' factor." Id. at
256, 79 Cal. Rptr. at 725.
In Arauz, the plaintiff's son was struck by defendant's automobile. 68 Cal.
App. 3d at 939, 137 Cal. Rptr. at 620. The plaintiff arrived at the scene within
approximately five minutes to see her son with blood on his face. Id. at 940-41,
137 Cal. Rptr. at 621. The Arauz court denied recovery stating that "the shock
claimed by plaintiff Arauz resulted from seeing her son after the accident and,
therefore, 'under circumstances not materially different from those undergone
by every parent whose child has been injured in an unobserved and antecedent
accident.' " Id. at 949, 137 Cal. Rptr. at 627 (quoting Powers v. Sissoev, 39 Cal.
App. 3d 865, 874, 114 Cal. Rptr. 868, 874 (1974)).
The analysis under Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728, 441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal.
Rptr. 72 (1968), is very similar for these two cases. The two holdings, therefore,
seem to be irreconcilable. However, the commentator suggests that "the true
basis for the distinction between Archibald and Arauz was that Mrs. Archibald
witnessed a more gruesome scene; thus her emotional injury was more believa-
ble." Note, Limiting Liability, supra note 28, at 861.
It should be noted that the Supreme Court of California recently disap-
proved Archibald in Thing v. La Chusa, 48 Cal. 3d 664, 668, 771 P.2d 814, 830,
257 Cal. Rptr. 865, 881 (1989). For a discussion of La Chusa, see infra note 95.
69. Frame, 115 N.J. at 649, 560 A.2d at 681. For a discussion of whether the
plaintiff must observe the "act or results," see supra notes 55-64 and accompany-
ing text.
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the defendant's malpractice and the resulting injury.70
3. When did the observation take place?
The bystander recovery rule requires that the observation be con-
temporaneous with the tortious event. 7 1 In medical malpractice cases,
especially misdiagnosis situations, the negligent act, the injury and the
observation will generally not be simultaneous. 72 Thus, a timeliness is-
sue may arise in two contexts: (1) when did the injury manifest itself,73
and (2) when was the injury observed?7 4
a. The injury may occur somewhat gradually
As a general proposition, the gradual deterioration of health of a
close family member will not support an action for emotional distress. 75
This proposition is supported by the two underlying principles in medi-
cal malpractice emotional distress cases-that (1) "a slow deterioration
in health is characteristic of the type of harm with which individuals are
expected to cope" and (2) that "an element of emotional preparation
exists when the injury develops slowly."'7 6 The Frame court discussed a
number of cases that support this proposition. 7 7 In recognizing that re-
70. Frame, 115 N.J. at 649, 560 A.2d at 681.
As to the defendant's malpractice, the Frame court made specific reference
to the 2:00 p.m. telephone call during which the defendant's misdiagnosis took
place. Id. at 650, 560 A.2d at 681. It appears that the Frames' presence on the
telephone call with the defendant physician was a sufficient sensory perception
of the physician's negligent act (i.e., the misdiagnosis) and would have supported
recovery had the court concluded that the resulting injury was sufficiently con-
temporaneous with this perception.
As to the resulting injury, the court stated that "[t]he injury must be one
that is susceptible to immediate sensory perception, and the plaintiff must wit-
ness the victim when the injury is inflicted or immediately thereafter." Id. at
644, 560 A.2d at 678. Here, the court concluded that the observed injury-
seeing Arik in a moribund state four hours after the telephone call-was not
immediate enough. Id. at 650, 560 A.2d at 681.
71. See Portee v.Jaffee, 84 N.J. 88, 101, 417 A.2d 521, 528 (1980) (observa-
tion of injury must be made "at the scene of the accident"); see also Case Com-
ment, supra note 28, at 947 (timeliness limitation is required so that bystander
recovery does not extend to any close relative who happens to see injured per-
son at some time while injury is still evident).
72. See Frame, 115 N.J. at 645, 560 A.2d at 678 ("Hours, days, or months
may separate a misdiagnosis, the manifestation of the injury to the patient, and
the family member's observation of the injury.").
The more typical bystander cases have involved some sudden accident. For
a discussion of the typical bystander case, see supra note 29 and accompanying
text.
73. See Case Comment, supra note 28, at 945-46.
74. See id. at 947-48.
75. See id. at 945-46.
76. Id. at 946.
77. See Frame, 115 N.J. at 645-48, 560 A.2d at 679-81. The court first stated
that the Lindenmuth decision can be interpreted as "denying recovery when the
mother watched the deterioration of her child over a period of three days with-
490 [Vol. 35: p. 477
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covery may be justified in certain medical malpractice situations, how-
out appreciation of the impact of the doctor's act of malpractice." Id. at 645,
560 A.2d at 679. For a discussion of the Lindenmuth case, see supra notes 46-49
and accompanying text.
The Frame court discussed cases from other jurisdictions. In Amodio v.
Cunningham, 182 Conn. 80, 438 A.2d 6 (1980), the plaintiff had brought her
daughter to the defendant physician because the child was having trouble
breathing. Id. at 83-84, 438 A.2d at 8. The defendant failed to diagnose the
serious nature of the child's respiratory problems and allowed her to return
home. Id. The next day the child began gasping for breath and her heart
stopped momentarily while her mother administered mouth-to-mouth resuscita-
tion. Id. The child was rushed to the hospital but died two days later, after
artificial life-support was discontinued. Id. The plaintiff sought to recover for
the emotional distress she suffered as a result of witnessing her daughter's de-
cline and death. Id. The Amodio court denied recovery, stating that "the injuries
suffered by the plaintiff's child became manifest a considerable period of time
after the alleged negligence of the defendants occurred." Id. at 93, 438 A.2d at
12.
In Williams v. Baker, 540 A.2d 449, vacated and reh 'g granted, 540 A.2d 449,
457 (D.C. 1988), the plaintiff had brought her son to the emergency room of a
hospital because he was suffering from a very high temperature. Id. at 450. The
defendant physician diagnosed the boy as suffering from a minor virus. Id. He
prescribed some tablets and sent him home. Id. Late that night the boy was
seized with a coughing spell, began choking and lost consciousness. Id. The
plaintiff rushed her son to the hospital where a tube was inserted into the child's
throat in order to allow him to breathe. Id. The boy was transferred to another
hospital in critical condition. Id. The boy spent 13 days in the hospital before
he was released. Id.
The plaintiff sought recovery for the emotional distress she suffered as a
result of the defendant's negligence. Id. The plaintiff alleged, among other
things, that after being told that her son "had survived a life threatening epi-
sode, she continued to feel hysterical and worried 'about the possibility of brain
damage.'" Id. The District of Columbia Court of Appeals denied recovery, re-
fusing to adopt a Dillon approach and stated that even if it were to adopt such an
approach, there is no "element of a sudden shock" in the facts before it which
would justify recovery. Id. at 457. The ultimate decision in the case is yet to be
determined, since the case was vacated and the petition for rehearing en banc
was granted. Id.
In Wilson v. Galt, 100 N.M. 227, 668 P.2d 1104 (Ct. App.), cert. quashed, 100
N.M. 192, 668 P.2d 308 (N.M. 1983), the defendant physician failed to diagnose
that the plaintiffs' newborn son was suffering from bilirubin encephalopathy (the
accumulation in the brain of the yellow pigment in bile). Id. at 230, 668 P.2d at
1107. As a result of this misdiagnosis, the child suffered brain damage. Id. The
plaintiff parents sought to recover for the emotional distress they suffered due to
the defendant's negligence. Id. The New Mexico Court of Appeals denied re-
covery, stating that the "complaint indicates no observation by either parent of a
sudden trauma involving [the child]. The allegations suggest a gradual occur-
rence of harm, and awareness by the parents of the deterioration but not of the
cause." Id. at 233, 668 P.2d at 1110.
It should be noted, however, that in discussing the Wilson case the Frame
court did not discuss the Wilson court's reasoning. See Frame, 115 N.J. at 647,
560 A.2d at 680. The Wilson court refused to adopt and apply a Dillon type anal-
ysis to the case. 100 N.M. at 233, 668 P.2d at 1110. The Wilson court stated that
"California has refused to extend Dillon v. Legg to the medical malpractice field."
Id. (citing Jansen v. Children's Hosp. Medical Center, 31 Cal. App. 3d 22, 106
Cal. Rptr. 883 (1973)). Although this may have been true in 1983 when the
Wilson case was decided, California has since applied Dillon in medical malprac-
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ever, the Frame court relied heavily on the California Supreme Court's
decision in Ochoa v. Superior Court.
78
The Ochoa court focused on the issue as to "whether, in order to
state a cause of action under Dillon [v. Legg], the child's injury must have
been the result of a brief and sudden occurrence viewed contemporane-
ously by the plaintiff."7 9 After discussing a number of California cases,
the court rejected the "sudden occurrence" requirement as an "unwar-
ranted restriction on the Dillon guidelines." 80
In place of the strict suddenness requirement, the Ochoa court pro-
vided that "when there is observation of the defendant's conduct and
the child's injury and contemporaneous awareness [that] the defendant's
conduct or lack thereof is causing harm to the child, recovery is permit-
ted." 8' The Frame court agreed with this approach.8 2 Thus, both Ochoa
tice cases. See, e.g., Ochoa v. Superior Court, 39 Cal. 3d 159, 703 P.2d 1, 216
Cal. Rptr. 661 (1985). For a discussion of the Ochoa case, see infra notes 78-83
and accompanying text.
78. See Frame, 115 N.J. at 648-49, 560 A.2d at 680-81 (discussing Ochoa v.
Superior Court, 39 Cal. 3d 159, 703 P.2d 1, 216 Cal. Rptr. 661 (1985)).
In Ochoa, the plaintiff mother visited her thirteen-year-old son who was in
custody in a county juvenile hall. Ochoa, 39 Cal. 3d at 163, 703 P.2d at 3, 216
Cal. Rptr. at 663. The boy had become ill and had been placed in the juvenile
hall's infirmary. Id. While her son went into convulsions, hallucinated, vomited,
coughed up blood, and complained of great pain, the mother remained by his
side and tried as best she could to comfort him. Id. at 163-64, 703 P.2d at 3-4,
216 Cal. Rptr. at 663-64. She continually importuned the defendant doctor to
allow her to take her son to their family physician. Id. Finally, the mother was
ordered to leave and did so in an emotional turmoil. Id. at 164, 703 P.2d at 4,
216 Cal. Rptr. at 664 (After defendants insisted that plaintiff leave her son,
" '[s]he bent down to kiss him and [he] clasped her tightly and pleaded that she
[stay] because he was so sick.' . .. [The mother] never again saw her son alive.").
The next morning her son died. Id.
The Ochoa court held that the plaintiff could state a cause of action to re-
cover for the emotional harm suffered as a result of the defendants' negligence.
Id. at 165, 170, 703 P.2d at 4, 8, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 664, 668.
79. Ochoa, 39 Cal. 3d at 167, 703 P.2d at 6, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 666 (citing
Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728, 441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968)) (emphasis
added).
80. Id. at 168, 703 P.2d at 7, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 667 (The court stated that the
"sudden occurrence" requirement "arbitrarily limits liability when there is a
high degree of foreseeability of shock to the plaintiff and the shock flows from an
abnormal event, and, as such, unduly frustrates the goal of compensation-the
very purpose which the cause of action was meant to further.").
81. Id. at 170, 703 P.2d at 8, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 668. As to the facts before it,
the Ochoa court stated:
[The mother] was aware of and observed conduct by the defendants
which produced injury in her child. She was aware of the fact that her
child was in need of immediate medical attention. To her knowledge
the defendants had failed to provide the necessary care. . . . [S]he was
able to perceive, and suffered shock, from the connection between de-
fendants' conduct and her child's injury.
Id. at 169-70, 703 P.2d at 8, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 668.
82. Frame, 115 N.J. at 649, 560 A.2d at 681 ("In an appropriate case, if a
family member witnesses the physician's malpractice, observes the effect of the
[Vol. 35: p. 477
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and Frame allow recovery even if the harm occurs somewhat gradually.85
One difficulty with this approach became apparent when the Frame
court applied the new rule. The court required that the negligent mis-
diagnosis "manifest itself in an immediate injury."'8 4 This application
seems inconsistent with Ochoa and the very rule set forth by Frame.
Thus, defendants should argue for strict adherence to this immediate
injury language, while plaintiffs should argue that the immediate injury
language should be interpreted liberally (in line with Ochoa).8 5 That is,
plaintiffs should argue that the manifestation of the injury was suffi-
ciently contemporaneous with the misdiagnosis such that the plaintiff
was able to understand the causal relationship between the physician's
misdiagnosis and the resulting injury.8 6
b. The injury must be observed at its inception
In general "[t]he plaintiff's observation of the injuries should be
malpractice on the patient, and immediately connects the malpractice with the
injury, that may be sufficient to allow recovery for the family member's emo-
tional distress.").
83. See PRossER & KEETON ON TORTS, supra note 28, § 54, at 61 n.76 (Supp.
1989) ("California has ruled that the Dillon principles may apply even if the harm
occurs gradually, rather than from a brief and sudden occurrence.") (citing
Ochoa, 39 Cal. 3d 159, 703 P.2d 1, 216 Cal. Rptr. 661); see also Budavari v. Barry,
176 Cal. App. 3d 849, 853 n.4, 222 Cal. Rptr. 446, 448 n.4 (1986) ("The 'event'
witnessed in a Dillon case need not, however, be a 'brief and sudden occurrence'
producing an immediate injury. A course of negligence lasting over a period of
several hours, and witnessed by the plaintiff, is actionable.") (citing Ochoa, 39
Cal. 3d at 168, 703 P.2d at 7, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 667). Fori a discussion of
Budavari, see supra note 59.
84. Frame, 115 N.J. at 650, 560 A.2d at 681 (emphasis added).
85. In Ochoa, the plaintiff's emotional trauma resulted from the defendant
physician's medical neglect of her son while the son was in custody in a county
juvenile hall. Ochoa, 39 Cal. 3d at 163, 703 P.2d at 3, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 663.
When the plaintiff initially visited her son, he was very pale and looked dehy-
drated. Id. In addition, his skin was clammy and sweaty. Id. Thus, it appears
that the physician's neglect had resulted in an immediate injury. This alone,
however, was not the basis for the plaintiff's emotional distress claim. The boy's
condition continued to deteriorate. Id. The plaintiff's pleas to the physician to
allow her to take her son to a private doctor were dismissed. Id. at 163-64, 703
P.2d at 3-4, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 663-64. It was this gradual deterioration and the
continued neglect by the defendant which brought on the plaintiff's emotional
trauma. Id. at 169-70, 703 P.2d at 8, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 668.
The factual situation before the Frame court was different. The negligent
misdiagnosis that occurred during the 2:00 p.m. phone call did not manifest
itself until four hours later when the parents found their son in a death-like con-
dition. Frame, 115 N.J. at 650, 560 A.2d at 681. Eleven more hours passed
before the Frames learned that their son had died. Id. In denying recovery for
their emotional distress, the Frame court stated that "[t]he chain of circum-
stances, although deeply tragic, were [sic] not 'shocking.' " Id. For a discussion
of the shocking event limitation, see supra notes 66-68 and accompanying text.
86. Given the decision reached in Frame, it is possible that four hours would
be an outer limit on this time frame. See Frame, 115 N.J. at 650, 560 A.2d at 681.
1990]
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contemporaneous with their inception."' 87 The Frame decision does not
require that the negligent act, the manifestation of the injury, and the
observation all occur in a brief sudden event. However, it is submitted
that the injury must be observed at its inception and that this observa-
tion must be reasonably contemporaneous with the defendant's negli-
gent act such that the plaintiff understands that it is the defendant's act
that has caused the injury.8 8 Without this connection the situation of
the bystander parent is like that of "any parent who witnesses the pain
and suffering of his or her child due to illness or injury and is unaware
that the defendant's conduct is a contributing factor to the continued
pain and suffering." 89
The justification for such a comparison in the Frame case, however,
is not entirely clear. The Frames were acting according to the specific
instructions of the defendant physician. 90 Therefore, it seems unrea-
sonable to conclude without discussion that when the Frames tried to
wake their son and found him moribund they were entirely unaware that
the defendant's actions had contributed to their son's condition.9 '
87. Case Comment, supra note 28, at 948.
88. See Frame, 115 N.J. at 645-46, 560 A.2d at 679 ("[O]ne family member
should not recover for emotional distress resulting from the misdiagnosis of an-
other family member, at least in the absence of a close temporal connection
between the misdiagnosis and the injury, as well as the contemporaneous obser-
vation of the injury by the family member.").
The Ochoa decision, on which Frame relied, found that the factual situation
in Ochoa was distinguishable from other cases which have denied recovery in that
the plaintiff "was able to perceive, and suffered shock, from the connection be-
tween defendants' conduct and her child's injury." Ochoa, 39 Cal. 3d at 170, 703
P.2d at 8, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 668. The facts of the cases suggest that this connec-
tion is likely to be much more apparent in a medical neglect case, like Ochoa,
than in a typical misdiagnosis case, like Frame.
89. Ochoa, 39 Cal. 3d at 170, 703 P.2d at 8, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 668; see Frame,
115 N.J. at 650, 560 A.2d at 681.
In denying recovery to the parents for their emotional distress, the Frame
court stated that "[i]n a sense, their situation was like that of parents who wit-
nessed the pain and suffering of their child due to illness or injury without
awareness that a medical misdiagnosis was contributing to their child's contin-
ued pain and suffering." Frame, 115 NJ. at 650, 560 A.2d at 681 (citing Ochoa,
39 Cal. 3d 159, 703 P.2d 1, 216 Cal. Rptr. 661).
90. Frame, 115 NJ. at 640, 560 A.2d at 676. The defendant physician told
the Frames that their son was suffering from a virus but that they should wake
him every four hours to check for signs of head injury. Id. When the Frames
woke their son they became nervous because the boy had vomited and his eyes
were pivoting. Id. The defendant, however, advised the Frames to let their son
sleep for another four hours. Id. at 641, 560 A.2d at 677. When they tried to
awaken their son four hours later he was in a death-like state. Id.
91. Id. at 650, 560 A.2d at 681 (citing Ochoa, 39 Cal. 3d 159, 703 P.2d 1,
216 Cal. Rptr. 661).
As a general matter, it is not clear that the distinction between plaintiffs who
connect the defendant's conduct to the family member's injury and plaintiffs
who merely witness the traumatic results of the negligent act is a meaningful
distinction. It is submitted that there are two justifications for such a distinction.
First, the distinction may simply be a method of allowing recovery in certain
494 [Vol. 35: p. 477
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B. Frame Briefly Addresses Policy Considerations
The Frame court was confronted with a bystander emotional distress
issue against a backdrop of confusion. The courts have set forth various
rules and guidelines that allow bystanders to recover for their emotional
distress,9 2 but defining the limits of such liability continues to present
difficult problems.9 3 The commentators have criticized the courts and
have proposed recovery formulations of their own.9 4 Judges have ex-
medical misdiagnosis situations without "opening the floodgates" to any family
member who happens to see the results. Cf id. at 649-50, 560 A.2d at 681 (court
acknowledging possible economic effects on medical profession). Using this jus-
tification, the distinction between such plaintiffs is realistically portrayed as an
arbitrary line drawn primarily for economic concerns.
A second justification is that the plaintiff's shock and mental trauma may
actually be brought on or enhanced by the defendant's conduct, and not merely
by the results. The Ochoa court seemed to follow this view, noting the plaintiff's
allegation that she "experienced extreme mental and emotional distress and
concern for her son and for [sic] the apparent outrageous neglect of medical
care while she was present." Ochoa, 39 Cal. 3d at 170, 703 P.2d at 8, 216 Cal.
Rptr. at 668 (brackets in original) (citing plaintiff's complaint). The Ochoa court
went on to find that the plaintiff "was able to perceive, and suffered shock, from
the connection between the defendant's conduct and her child's injury." Id.
Given this analysis, the distinction between plaintiffs who connect the defend-
ant's conduct to the family member's injury and plaintiffs who merely witness
the traumatic results of the negligent act seems reasonable. The Ochoa court's
analysis, however, points to an additional problem.
The Ochoa court went on to hold that, although the plaintiff must make a
connection between the defendant's conduct and the family member's injury,
the plaintiff does not have to be aware of the tortious nature of the defendant's
conduct. Id. Although this may relieve plaintiffs of some of their burden in
proving emotional distress claims, it seems to make the whole distinction irrele-
vant. That is, what is the difference between a parent who understands that the
defendant's actions are causing harm to her child but does not understand that
the defendant's conduct is "wrong" and a parent who suffers mental trauma
when she finds her child injured but does not know that it was the defendant's
actions that caused the injury?
Thus, the real justification for requiring plaintiffs to show that they were
able to "connect" the defendant's conduct with the family member's injury is
that the courts want to allow recovery but only in narrowly circumscribed situa-
tions so as to quell the "general fear of unlimited liability." See Note, Limiting
Liability, supra note 28, at 847 n.7.
92. See, e.g., Portee v. Jaffee, 84 N.J. 88, 101, 417 A.2d 521, 528 (1980);
Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728, 740-41, 441 P.2d 912, 920, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72, 80
(1968).
93. See Case Comment, supra note 28, at 933 ("Defining the limits of liabil-
ity continues to present the most significant obstacle to reaching a rational
rule."); see also Ochoa, 39 Cal. 3d at 178, 703 P.2d at 14, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 674
(Grodin,J., concurring) ("[T]here remain after today's opinion numerous ques-
tions concerning the application of the Dillon guidelines which have proved
troublesome to the lower courts and which this court must, sooner or later, con-
front and resolve.").
94. See generally Diamond, supra note 28 (criticizing Dillon and arguing for
unified compensation system); Miller, The Scope of Liability for Negligent Infliction of
Emotional Distress: Making "The Punishment Fit The Crime", 1 U. HAw. L. REV. 1
(1979) (advocating application of general tort principles with limitation on re-
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pressly discussed the numerous criticisms and formulations and have
continued to reach different conclusions. 9 5
covery in mental distress cases). Professor Diamond criticizes Dillon because
only one of the Dillon guidelines, the close relationship factor, is clearly relevant
to foreseeability. Diamond, supra note 28, at 488-89. He also agrees with Pro-
fessor Miller and argues for a recovery theory that would extend to "all foresee-
able plaintiffs who suffer serious mental injury, but that recovery should be
limited to economic 'out of pocket' losses." Id. at 502 (emphasis in original). See
generally Note, Limiting Liability, supra note 28 (criticizing a number of alternative
recovery theories). The Note proposes a rule that allows recovery for those
types of emotional distress for which a reasonable person would be emotionally
unprepared. See id. at 866-73. The Note suggests that some types of mental
distress, such as grief, should not warrant recovery because they are "an una-
voidable part of everyone's life." Id. at 870.
95. See Ochoa, 39 Cal. 3dat 178-81, 703 P.2d at 14-16, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 674-
76 (Grodin, J., concurring). Justice Grodin discussed many of the formulations
proposed by the various commentators and recognized that "the choice inevita-
bly involves difficult questions of public policy, including a determination as to
whether the nature of emotional injury requires any limitations upon recovery
that are not imposed also upon physical injury and, if so, precisely what those
limitations ought to be." Id. at 181, 703 P.2d at 16, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 676
(Grodin, J., concurring).
See also id. at 181-96, 703 P.2d at 16-27, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 676-87 (Bird, C.J.,
concurring in part, dissenting in part). Chief Justice Bird discussed numerous
cases that have applied the Dillon guidelines and argued for a clearly simplified
approach. The ChiefJustice provided the following conclusion:
The Dillon guidelines originally envisioned as aids in determining
reasonable foreseeability have been transformed into rigid, threshold
requirements for recovery. Arbitrary, inconsistent and inequitable re-
sults are the rule. The Molien [v. Kaiser Found. Hosps., 27 Cal. 3d 916,
616 P.2d 813, 167 Cal. Rptr. 831 (1980)] 'direct victim' scheme, at least
as construed by the majority, only adds another layer of confusion.
The majority's reasoning simply perpetuates the problem.
The answer lies in a careful reading of the grounds on which Dillon
and Molien rest. An individual who suffers emotional distress, regard-
less of whether he or she is a 'direct victim' or a 'bystander,' should be
able to recover damages if (1) the emotional distress was reasonably
foreseeable and (2) the distress suffered was serious. The concepts of
reasonable foreseeability and serious injury, employed together, ade-
quately protect against unlimited liability and provide a principled basis
for determining it. Dillon should remain a guidepost to assist the trier
of fact in determining liability.
Id. at 195-96, 703 P.2d at 27, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 687 (Bird, C.J., concurring in
part, dissenting in part).
The Supreme Court of California has very recently addressed the commen-
tators' criticisms and the inconsistent applications of the Dillon guidelines in
what could be described as a rather unexpected and dramatic reformulation and
reaffirmance of the now 20-year-old bystander recovery rule. See Thing v. La
Chusa, 48 Cal. 3d 644, 771 P.2d 814, 257 Cal. Rptr. 865 (1989).
In La Chusa the plaintiff's minor son was struck by the defendant's automo-
bile. Id. at 647, 771 P.2d at 815, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 866. The plaintiff mother did
not see or hear the accident but arrived at the scene to find her son lying in the
street, bloody and unconscious. Id. at 647-648, 771 P.2d at 815, 257 Cal. Rptr.
at 866. The plaintiff sought to recover for the emotional distress she suffered.
Id. at 648, 771 P.2d at 815, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 866.
In deciding the case, the La Chusa court specifically addressed the issue of
496
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In reaching the conclusion that, under certain circumstances, it
would allow plaintiffs who observe a physician's negligent misdiagnosis
and its results to recover for emotional distress, the Frame court con-
fronted difficult questions of policy. 96 The court recognized the effects
that such a cause of action could have on the economics of the medical
profession. 97 However, the Frame court determined that "any added
whether the Dillon guidelines were adequate. Id. at 647, 771 P.2d at 815, 257
Cal. Rptr. at 866. The Court discussed the criticisms and inconsistent applica-
tion of Dillon. Id. at 661-67, 771 P.2d at 825-29, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 876-80. The
La Chusa court responded to this criticism and to the confusing situation in the
lower courts by turning the Dillon "guidelines" into a rigid three-part test,
stating:
[A] plaintiff may recover damages for emotional distress caused by ob-
serving the negligently inflicted injury of a third person if, but only if,
said plaintiff: (1) is closely related to the injury victim; (2) is present at
the scene of the injury producing event at the time it occurs and is then
aware that it is causing injury to the victim; and (3) as a result suffers
serious emotional distress-a reaction beyond that which would be an-
ticipated in a disinterested witness and which is not an abnormal re-
sponse to the circumstances.
Id. at 667-68, 771 P.2d at 829-30, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 880-81 (emphasis added)
(footnotes omitted).
The La Chusa court thus rejected that portion of the Ochoa opinion which
described the Dillon factors as mere guideposts. Id. at 668, 771 P.2d at 830, 257
Cal. Rptr. at 881.
The La Chusa court denied recovery to the plaintiff in the case before it,
stating:
[The] plaintiff was not present at the scene of the accident in which her
son was injured. She did not observe defendant's conduct and was not
aware that her son was being injured. She could not, therefore, estab-
lish a right to recover for the emotional distress she suffered when she
subsequently learned of the accident and observed its consequences.
Id. at 669, 771 P.2d at 830, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 881.
The question now arises whether the New Jersey Supreme Court will adopt
this approach. That is, after Frame, will the New Jersey Supreme Court continue
to take a more liberal stance toward the application of the bystander recovery
rule? Or will it adopt the much more rigid stance recently adopted by the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court in La Chusa?
96. Frame, 115 NJ. at 649, 560 A.2d at 681. Specifically, the court stated
that:
[W]e recognize that the evaluation of a family member's claim for emo-
tional distress involves drawing lines. Whenever a court draws lines, it
risks the criticism of arbitrariness. Drawing lines, however, is the busi-
ness of the courts, and lines must be drawn to provide remedies for
wrongs without exposing wrongdoers to unlimited liability.
Id.
97. Id. at 649-50, 560 A.2d at 681. The Frame court recognized that a physi-
cian's negligence in misdiagnosing a patient may lead to tragic consequences
that could expose the physician to enormous liability. Id. at 644, 560 A.2d at
678. The court, however, did not set forth a detailed discussion of the policies
involved. The court simply stated that it was "sensitive to the concerns . . .of
the medical profession." Id. at 649-50, 560 A.2d at 681. But see id. at 651-53,
560 A.2d at 682-83 (Wilentz, C.J., and Garibaldi, J., concurring) (arguing that
majority's decision was premature in that societal policies were not sufficiently
argued on record).
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cost to the medical profession from the recognition of such a claim is
outweighed by the suffering of severe emotional distress from the shock
of observing a misdiagnosis that results in immediate injury to a loved
one."
9 8
The cause of action that the Frame court recognized was "narrowly
circumscribed."-99 The court attempted to draw lines based on temporal
proximity. 0 0 The contemporaneous requirement as to both the mani-
festation of the injury and the observation by the plaintiff formed the
platform on which the lines were drawn.' 0 ' Thus, the limiting principle
in the third-party-medical-malpractice-emotional-distress cases is that
recovery will be denied to plaintiffs who seek to recover for emotional
distress resulting from the misdiagnosis of another family member when
there is no "close temporal connection between the misdiagnosis and
the injury, as well as the contemporaneous observation of the injury by
the family member."' 10 2
V. CONCLUSION
In Frame v. Kothari the Supreme Court of New Jersey considered the
right of a plaintiff to recover for the emotional distress caused by the
medical misdiagnosis of another member of the plaintiff's family.' 0 3
Obtaining such recovery under the Portee bystander recovery rule is diffi-
cult because very often the misdiagnosis, the resulting injury in the fam-
ily member, and the observation by the plaintiff will not be
simultaneous, as is the situation in the typical bystander recovery case.
The Frame court stated that under certain circumstances the negli-
gent misdiagnosis of a family member could support a claim for emo-
tional distress. In order to bring a cause of action under Frame, the
plaintiff must show that: (1) she witnessed the physician's negligent
treatment or diagnosis of a close family member; (2) she observed the
effects of such treatment or diagnosis, causing severe harm or death;
and (3) she immediately connected the physician's act with the injury. ' 0 4
Although the Frame court denied recovery on the facts of the case
before it, the spectrum of medical malpractice cases is wide. Frame
98. Id. at 650, 560 A.2d at 681.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 649, 560 A.2d at 681. "Temporal proximity" refers to the con-
temporaneous observation requirement. See PROSSER & KEETON ON TORTS, supra
note 28, § 54, at 366.
101. See Frame, 115 N.J. at 649, 560 A.2d at 681 ("[I]f a family member
witnesses the physician's malpractice, observes the effect of the malpractice on
the patient, and immediately connects the malpractice with the injury, that may
be sufficient to allow recovery.").
102. Id. at 646, 560 A.2d at 679 (discussing decisions from other courts as
consistent with this proposition).
103. Id. at 644, 560 A.2d at 678.
104. Id. at 649, 560 A.2d at 681.
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presents practitioners in New Jersey with a new legal argument, the
medical field with a new source of liability, and grieving parents with a
new method of compensating the uncompensatable.
Michael P. Gaughan
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